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Income variablity is likely to increase wage inequality if poorer households are more
vulnerable to shocks. Using a simple method to estimate risk−adjusted measures of wage
inequality and data from Mexico, this note shows that safety nets could offset a good part of
the impact of risk aversion on wage inequality.
Citation: Makdissi, Paul and Quentin Wodon, (2003) "Risk−adjusted measures of wage inequality and safety nets." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 1 pp. 1−10
Submitted: March 15, 2003.  Accepted: April 17, 2003.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2003/volume9/EB−03I30001A.pdf1 Introduction
When performing distributional analysis, economists usually rely on cross-
sectional data which give information on income at one point in time (e.g.,
Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000 and Lambert, 2002). However, it has long
been recognized that incomes are subject to variability and that this may
aﬀect welfare if individuals are risk averse. Of course, part of the wage vari-
ation may be "certain", or known a priori. In such case, well functioning
credit markets should allow individuals to manage the variations. Further-
more, if insurance markets are complete, individuals may also be able to
oﬀset the impact of the "uncertain" part of income variability on consump-
tion. Blundell and Preston (1998) suggest that this is the case in Britain.
But the impact of shocks may be more diﬃcult to oﬀset in developing coun-
tries where safety nets and credit markets are less well developed, and this
may have implications for inequality.
Atkinson (1970), Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) and Davies and Hoy (1995)
argue that there are links between the literatures on risk and inequality, be-
cause the mathematical structures used to discuss both concepts are similar.
In this note, we show that the concepts of risk and inequality can be used
jointly to estimate risk-adjusted measures of inequality. We propose a sim-
ple method to do so and we use this method to show how safety nets can
help oﬀset the impact of risk on wage inequality. The idea consists in re-
placing the mean income observed over a period of time in panel data by
the certainty-equivalent income. This is done using various parameters for
risk aversion among the population in order to test for the sensitivity of the
results to the level of risk aversion. We can then assess whether safety nets
such as unemployment beneﬁts for workers who lose their jobs would be able
to oﬀset the negative impact of risk aversion1. The rest of the notes runs as
follow. Section 2 presents the approach, which is then illustrated in section
1As pointed out by Ravallion (1988), when assessing income variability from conven-
tional data sets, one may have diﬃculties in distinguishing between two sources of vari-
ability: social mobility, which is linked to opportunities for self-advancement, and income
risk. In this note, we focus on the risk component of income variability. Because we use a
panel with quarterly interviews over a relatively short period of time, we assume that the
income variability observed in the data is entirely due to risk.
13 using Mexican wage data.
2 Framework
Suppose that there are S possible states of nature. Consider an individual
i with income xis in state s. The individual is exposed to variability in
income over the states of nature. As deﬁned in the risk theory literature, the







This certainty equivalent is the amount that, if received for sure in each
state of the world, would generate the same utility as the state-contingent
xis.Within a social welfare context, u(·) does not represent the Bernoulli util-
ity function of the individual, but rather a social judgement on the welfare
value of the random variable x, as suggested by the argument on the impar-
tial evaluation of welfare behind a veil of ignorance (see Vickrey, 1945 and
Harsanyi, 1953, 1955). We assume that u(·) is continuous with u0 (·) ≥ 0
and u00 (·) ≤ 0 for all y. The assumption on the ﬁrst derivative implies non-
satiation. The assumption on the second derivative implies that the social
welfare evaluation function is risk averse. One such function is the Constant




1−ρ if ρ 6=1
logx if ρ =1
, (2)
where ρ is the constant Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion coeﬃcient. The
CRRA function is interesting because it is similar in structure to the Atkin-
son indices of inequality (and social welfare.) We could of course use another
formulation for u(·). For example, relative risk aversion may be declining in
income. While a more general formulation such as the Hyperbolic Absolute
Risk Aversion (HARA) utility function would enable us to capture such phe-
nomenon, using the simpler CRRA will be suﬃcient here to highlight the
likely impact of risk on inequality measurement.



















is if ρ =1
. (3)
Given the vector of certainty equivalent incomes y =( y1,y 2,...,y n) where n
is the number of individuals, wage inequality can be measured by using any
inequality index such as the Gini coeﬃcient, the Theil index or the Atkinson
index among others. Here, we use the Atkinson (1970) index
IA =

   


















µy if ε =1
. (4)
where ε is an inequality aversion parameter.
In theory, inequality may be increased or reduced when risk aversion is
t a k e ni n t oa c c o u n t . I ft h o s ew h os u ﬀer from variability in income are ranked
near the top of the distribution, risk-adjusted inequality measures may be
lower than measures not taking into account risk. In practice however, since
much of the variability in income is likely to come from losses in employment,
and since poorer households tend to be more exposed to such losses, we
would expect risk-adjusted measures of inequality to be larger than inequality
measures estimated on mean expected income. Note that the same idea for
estimating risk-adjusted measures of inequality could easily be applied to
social welfare and poverty measurement, since we could use the certainty-
equivalent income of individuals to compute standard poverty measures.
3I l l u s t r a t i o n
The above framework is illustrated using data from Mexico’s urban employ-
ment survey (ENEU) for 1996. Information on wage income is given on a
quarterly basis, and we have ﬁve observations for each individual. Since in
practice, we do not know about potential states of the world, we assume that
3those income observations are drawn from the ﬁve point distribution given in
the panel. We restrict the sample to adult males who have a positive income
in at least one of the ﬁve periods.
To deal with zero observations (xis =0 ) and to simulate the potential
impact of safety nets on inequality, we assume that instead of having no
resources at all, individuals actually have a minimum level of resources. For
baseline estimates of inequality, we set this minimum at 1/20th of the mean
wage observed in the data. We then test for the sensitivity of the impact of
risk aversion to increases in this subsistence level wage. The simulations can
be interpreted as a test of whether various levels of unemployment beneﬁts
(which are currently not existing in Mexico) for individuals with zero income
would be able to oﬀset the impact of risk aversion. For example, if with a
transfer of 1/5th o ft h em e a nw a g et oa l lt h o s ew i t hz e r oi n c o m e ,t h el e v e l
of risk-adjusted inequality is not higher than the level of inequality observed
with the mean wage over the ﬁve periods (which assumes no risk aversion
with ρ =0 ) and a subsistence wage of 1/20th of the mean wage, we will say
that the transfer is successful in oﬀsetting the impact of risk on inequality.
Said diﬀerently, the empirical question is what level of transfers might be
necessary to oﬀset the impact of risk. A higher level of risk aversion will
require a higher transfer to compensate for the impact of risk aversion on
inequality.
Table 1 provides the estimates of the Atkinson indices of inequalilty for
diﬀerent values of ρ and ε. We compute estimates for values of ρ ∈ [0,8],
because these are the values typically used in the literature. For instance,
Mehra and Prescott (1985) use ρ ∈ [0,10]. Arrow (1971) has argued on theo-
retical grounds that ρ should be around 1, but Friend and Blume (1975) have
presented empirical evidence based on portfolio holdings that the coeﬃcient
may be around 2, and Hildreth and Knowles (1982) have obtained estimates
between 1 and 2. By considering a larger interval, as done by Mehra and
Prescott (1985), we can be conﬁdent that we cover most possible values for
this coeﬃcient.
Consider the ﬁrst row of Table 1 as the base case (minimum income
support and no risk aversion). For ε =0 .5, the Atkinson index of inequality
is 0.17. This increases to 0.18 with ρ =2and 0.19 with ρ =4 .T h eq u e s t i o n
4is: what level of transfer for those with zero income would be enough to oﬀset
the impact of risk aversion, namely the increase in inequality from 0.17 to
0.18 or 0.19. Table 1 shows that a transfer equal to 1/10th of the mean wage
would be suﬃcient to oﬀset the impact of risk aversion, since for both ρ =2
and ρ =4and that level of transfer, we remain at a level of inequality of
0.17.
The impact of risk aversion is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
shows the impact of risk aversion (as represented by the curves for diﬀerent
values of ρ) and aversion to inequality (on the horizontal axis) on inequality
under the baseline scenario (subsistence wage equal to 1/20th of the mean
wage.) Higher aversion to risk and higher aversion to inequality both increase
inequality measures. Figure 2 shows how inequality measures behave with
at r a n s f e ro f1/3rd of mean wage. The transfer is able to oﬀset a good part
of the impact of risk aversion on inequality.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Analysts often rely on cross-sectional statistics on income to assess inequality,
social welfare and poverty. But the results do not reﬂect the risk component
associated with income variability. In this note, we have provided a simple
method for ensuring that risk is taken into account. The method is based on
the concept of the certainty-equivalent income standard in the risk literature.
An illustration for Mexico suggests that transfers to those who lose their
income due to unemployment and other factors would have the potential to
oﬀset a good part of the impact of risk aversion on inequality.
References
[1] Arrow, K.J. (1971), Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Horth-
Holland, Amsterdam.
[2] Atkinson, A. B. (1970), On the Measurement of Inequality, Journal of
Economic Theory, 2, 244-263.
5[3] Atkinson, A.B. and F. Bourguignon, eds (2000), Handbook of Income
Distribution, Handbooks in Economics, vol. 16, Elsevier Science, Ams-
terdam.
[4] Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson (1978), Measures of Relative Equality
and Their Meaning in Terms of Social Welfare, Journal of Economic
Theory, 18, 59-80.
[5] Blundell, R. and I. Preston (1998), Consumption Inequality and Income
Uncertainty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XX, 603-640.
[6] Davies, J. and M. Hoy (1995), Making Inequality Comparisons When
Lorenz Curves Intersect, American Economic Review, 85, 980-986.
[7] Friend, I. and M.E. Blume (1975), The Demand for Risky Assets, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 65, 900-922.
[8] Harsanyi, J.C. (1953), Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in
Theory of Risk-Taking, Journal of Political Economy, 61, 434-435.
[9] Harsanyi, J.C. (1955), Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and In-
terpersonal Comparisons of Utility, Journal of Political Economy, 63,
309-321.
[10] Hildreth, C. and G.J. Knowles (1982), Some Estimates of Farmers’ Util-
ity Functions, Technical Bulletin 335, Agricultural Experimental Sta-
tion, University of Minnesota.
[11] Lambert, P.J. (2002), The Distribution and Redistribution of Income:
A Mathematical Analysis, 3rd Edition, Manchester University Press,
Manchester.
[12] Mehra, R. and E.C. Prescott (1985), The Equity Premium, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 15, 145-161.
[13] Ravallion, M. (1988), Expected Poverty under Risk-induced Welfare
Variability, Economic Journal, 98, 1171-1182.
6[14] Vickrey, W. (1945), Measuring Marginal Utility by Reaction to Risk,
Econometrica, 13, 319-333.
[15] Yitzhaki, S. and J. Slemrod (1991), Welfare Dominance: An Application




Risk (ρ )  A(0.5)  A(1)  A(2) 
  Transfer equal to 1/20
th of mean wage for those with zero wage 
0  0.17  0.29  0.48 
2  0.18  0.33  0.58 
4  0.19  0.36  0.64 
6  0.20  0.37  0.66 
8  0.20  0.38  0.66 
  Transfer equal to 1/10
th of mean wage for those with zero wage 
0  0.17  0.29  0.45 
2  0.17  0.29  0.48 
4  0.17  0.31  0.53 
6  0.18  0.32  0.54 
8  0.18  0.32  0.55 
  Transfer equal to 1/5
th of mean wage for those with zero wage 
0  0.16  0.27  0.42 
2  0.15  0.26  0.42 
4  0.16  0.27  0.45 
6  0.16  0.28  0.46 
8  0.16  0.28  0.47 
  Transfer equal to 1/3
rd of mean wage for those with zero wage 
0  0.16  0.26  0.40 
2  0.14  0.25  0.39 
4  0.14  0.25  0.42 
6  0.15  0.26  0.44 
8  0.15  0.26  0.44 
  Transfer equal to half of mean wage for those with zero wage 
0  0.15  0.26  0.39 
2  0.14  0.24  0.38 
4  0.14  0.24  0.41 
6  0.14  0.25  0.43 


























0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
Aversion to inequality
I
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y rho=0
rho=8
 
 Source: Authorsí estimation using Mexicoís ENEU for 1996. 
 